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COMMENT
ESTABLISHING LIABILITY FOR THE
DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS
WASTES: AN ALTERNATIVE
ROUTE FOR LOVE CANAL
PLAINTIFFS
In 1976, tests in homes near the abandoned Love Canal waste disposal
site at Niagara Falls, New York, revealed the presence of unsafe levels of
more than eighty toxic chemicals.' In the following years, nationwide at-
tention was drawn to the area2 as residents alleged that prolonged expo-
sure to air, land and water polluted by manufacturers' discarded wastes3
I. See HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., HAZARDOUS WASTE DIS-
POSAL 144 (Comm. Print 1979) (statement of William C. Hennessey, Comm'r, New York
State Department of Transportation and Chairman, Governor's Task Force on Love Canal,
State of New York) [hereinafter cited as DISPOSAL HEARINGS].
2' See generally Kittle, Living with Uncertainty. Saga of Love Canal Families, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., June 2, 1980, at 32.
3. Manufacturers face the task of disposing of solid waste throughout the production
cycle. Two factors have complicated their task. First, since production has increased, manu-
facturers have had to discard a greater volume of wastes. Second, as areas for receiving and
storing this waste become scarce, manufacturers may be forced to dump wastes in greater
proximity to residential areas. These factors increase the likelihood of personal injury from
waste which is improperly disposed.
The general term, solid waste, has been defined by the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA) as "any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including
solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial,
mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27)
(1976). "Solid waste" encompasses both hazardous and innocuous wastes. Hazardous
wastes, which are the focus of this Comment, have been defined as:
solid waste or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concen-
tration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may-(A) cause, or sig-
nificantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present or
potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976). See Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19
NAT. RESOURCES J. 249 (1979). Goldfarb's article quoted the following statistics compiled
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1977:
ten to twenty percent of all industrial wastes, excluding mining and agricultural
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were the cause of significant incidences of miscarriages, birth defects, and
certain types of cancer.4 As a result of the Love Canal tragedy, area resi-
dents have brought suit at the state level against the disposers' and the
City of Niagara Falls.6 In federal court, the United States has sued Hooker
Chemical and Plastics Co., and Hooker has counterclaimed against the
United States.7
When hazardous waste victims seek judicial redress for their injuries,
wastes, will be listed as hazardous. Thus, of the approximately 345 million tons of
industrial wastes generated annually, some 46 million tons are hazardous. Perhaps
90% of these hazardous wastes, or 41 million tons, is being disposed of improperly.
4. See Kittle, supra note 2. A study conducted for the EPA found that II of 36 Love
Canal residents tested had developed chromosomal damage linked to birth defects and
spontaneous abortions. [19801 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 78-79. Eight cases of cancer were dis-
covered among residents of 15 houses on 96th Street, a few blocks from the canal. Kittle,
supra note 2, at 32. But see Kolata, Love Canal- False Alarm Caused by Botched Study, 208
Sci. 1239 (1980), reprinted in CONSUMERS RESEARCH MAO., Sept. 1980, at 10. This article
reports that three cytogeneticists, selected by the United States Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), doubted the reliability of the EPA study because they said the cells
of the suspected population were not compared to a control sampling of a similar group. The
EPA study conductor, Dante Picciano, said he compared the Love Canal group to a popula-
tion he had studied earlier and which had no exposure to toxic chemicals. Picciano stated
that the study was conducted without a simultaneous control population because EPA allo-
cated too short a period in which to conduct the study. The other designer of the study, Dr.
Beverley Paigen of Roswell Park Memorial Institute, said EPA underfunded the study. See
[1979] 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1559; [19801 i ENV'T REP. (BNA) 143; [1980] 11 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 355.
5. The suits are in various stages of litigation but several have been reported. See, e.g.,
In re Peter Urban v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Co., 75 A.D.2d 720, 427 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1980);
Synder v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Co., 104 Misc. 2d 735, 429 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1980). In
Urban, Hooker was ordered to produce one of its employees who had already been ex-
amined by the plaintiff, as well as a third employee, to give a description of the design,
construction, use, maintenance, covering and closing of the Hooker Love Canal dump site.
In Synder, the court denied plaintiffs' request that their claims be certified as a class action.
6. Mervak v. City of Niagara Falls, 101 Misc. 2d 68, 420 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1979). In that
class action suit, plaintiffs requested that the court declare timely their filing of claims for
damages for personal injuries, wrongful deaths, and declining real estate values. New York
law requires that claimants filing suit against public corporations must give notice to those
corporations within 90 days of the accrual of their claims. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-
e(l)(a) (McKinney 1977). Plaintiffs sought to establish August 2, 1978, as the date of accrual
for 900 claims arising from the Love Canal incident. On that date, the New York State
Commission of Health declared that an emergency condition existed in the area contiguous
to the canal between 97th and 99th Streets. The court held that the question of "timeliness"
of a notice of claim which alleges personal injuries is not a subject matter for class action but
one which must be dealt with on an individual case by case basis since the injuries are not
identical and are not incurred at the same time. 101 Misc. 2d at 74, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 691-92.
The court declared that the notices of claim for diminished real estate values were appropri-
ate since, subsequent to the August 2, 1978 announcement of an emergency, all area prop-
erty values could be found to have plummeted. 101 Misc. 2d at 74, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
7. United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. (Love Canal Landfill), No. 79-990
(W.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 20, 1979).
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they must determine which parties are appropriate defendants and which
theories of liability they will assert. These plaintiffs must consider which
companies have caused their injury, whether a defendant company which
may have dumped chemicals as long as three decades ago still exists, and,
if it does, whether the company is capable of providing compensation. Be-
cause of the difficulty inherent in proving liability, commentators have
questioned the viability of hazardous waste plaintiffs' suits against the
disposers.'
Though the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)9 has not been utilized by
hazardous waste plaintiffs, it has proven to be a fairly successful avenue
for other tort plaintiffs who can demonstrate that the United States under-
took a duty to protect them but failed in adequately providing this protec-
tion. Furthermore, where United States liability is established under the
FTCA, indemnity from a joint tortfeasor is possible if the state in which
the United States sues recognizes the theory of indemnity.'0 In contrast to
the troublesome task facing the private hazardous waste plaintiff, the
United States government has successfully imposed liability on disposers
based on a public nuisance theory" under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). 2
8. See Comment, A Private Nuisance Approach to Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 7
OHIo N.U.L. REV. 86 (1980); Baurer, Love Canal- Common Law Approaches to a Modern
Tragedy, 11 ENVTL. L. 133 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Baurer, Love Canal]. Discussion of
the difficulties which hazardous waste plaintiffs will face under established theories of liabil-
ity may actually discourage the presentation of claims. This phenomenon was described in
the A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Wastes, HANDBOOK
324 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ALI-ABA]:
Lawyers acquainted with what little toxic substances injury law does exist may be
discouraging about the prospects of recovery. Thus a self-fulfilling prophecy may
be operating to discourage the filing of toxic substances claims. If people believe
that they cannot obtain recovery, their belief becomes real in its consequences.
They will, in fact, not seek recovery for their damages. Hence, there may be few
cases brought because there are fewer cases showing the way.
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976). The Act provides that "It]he United States shall be
liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." Id § 2674 (1976).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Illinois, 454 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
918 (1972). See Annot., 15 A.L.R. Fed. 665 (1973). See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying
text.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv. of New England, 496 F. Supp.
1127 (D. Conn. 1980) (United States allowed to request injunctive relief from defendant's
disposal of hazardous waste onto land or water on its premises based on common law theory
of nuisance); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973)
(on nuisance theory, the United States was granted injunctive relief against defendant's dis-
posal of waste water into Lake Michigan).
12. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976).
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Based on these developments in the areas of negligence and nuisance,
this Comment explores an alternative model to Love Canal plaintiffs' di-
rect suits against the disposers. Under this proposal, which is applicable to
suits by victims of other hazardous waste disposal, 3 Love Canal plaintiffs
would sue the United States under the FTCA' 4 claiming that the United
States was negligent in its undertaking to supervise national disposal prac-
tices. Under such a theory, the plaintiff could expect that the United States
would then file a third party claim for indemnification against the dispos-
ers of the hazardous wastes asserting the disposers' negligence i5 and nui-
sance. 6 The Comment analyzes the advantages and difficulties of such
suits under New York law.
In their FTCA suit, the Love Canal plaintiffs may argue that the United
States assumed the supervision of national waste disposal under the Public
Service Act of 194417 and that this constituted a "gratuitous undertaking"
within the meaning of section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'8
13. Although this Comment focuses on the hazardous waste problem of the Love Canal
plaintiffs and discusses New York law as it applies to the Love Canal suits, it presents gen-
eral theories of liability which may be used by hazardous waste plaintiffs in other
jurisdictions.
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
15. See United States v. Illinois, 454 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918
(1972) and infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv. of New England, 496 F. Supp.
1127 (D. Conn. 1980) and see infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
17. The Public Health Service Act of 1944, ch. 376, § 301, 58 Stat. 691 (1944) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1976)). The section states in pertinent part that the federal gov-
ernment, through the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, undertook to
encourage, cooperate with, and render assistance to other appropriate public au-
thorities . . . and promote the coordination of research, investigations, experi-
ments, demonstrations and studies relating to the causes, diagnosis, treatment,
control, and prevention of physical and mental diseases and impairments of man,
including water purification, sewage treatment, and pollution of lakes and streams.
See also 42 C.F.R. § 02.205 (1944) which states that "the United States would develop stan-
dards for sewage disposal and conduct basic research on sewage and industrial waste dispo-
sal and engage in intensive factfinding regarding the national need for sanitary facilities in
urban and rural areas." This Comment concentrates on one of the United States' earliest
undertakings in the area of regulating waste disposal. For a discussion of framing United
States' liability under the more recently enacted Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6978 (1976), Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2629 (1976) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), see Rosenblum, Hazard-
ous Wastes.- Regulatory Protection and the Government as Good Samaritan, TRIAL, January
1982, at 24 (synopsis) (complete article on file at American Trial Lawyers Ass'n).
18. The "gratuitous undertaking" doctrine recognizes that one who assumes to act, even
though gratuitously, may become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he or she acts at
all. Glanzer v. Shepherd, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965), which states:
[Vol. 31:273
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By failing to exercise reasonable care in performing this undertaking, the
United States breached its duty to protect the Love Canal plaintiffs. Since
New York law allows indemnification between two tortfeasors,19 the
United States may then file a third party claim for indemnity from the
manufacturers who disposed of the Love Canal wastes.
This Comment concludes that hazardous waste plaintiffs will encounter
several previously successful, but not insurmountaoie, United States' de-
fenses in their FTCA suit2" and that the United States may successfully
impose liability on the disposers based on grounds of negligence under the
FTCA2' and nuisance under the RCRA.22
I. THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM AT LOVE CANAL
In the 1930's and early 1940's, industrial wastes were dumped in free-
form23 into the Niagara Falls, New York, sewage system. In a 1940 report
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to an-
other which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's per-
son or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his
failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered be-
cause of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Courts often refer to the "gratuitous undertaking" doctrine and the good samaritan doc-
trine interchangeably. The good samaritan doctrine encompasses both §§ 323 & 324A of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). Section 324A provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to an-
other which he should recognize as necessary to the protection of a third person or
his things, is subject to liability to the third person for his physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the
harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the
undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). The distinction between the two sections
thus lies in whether the person who was the intended beneficiary of an undertaking was
injured or whether a third party, one not an intended beneficiary, was injured. Section 323
covers the first situation, whereas § 324A covers the latter. See infra notes 58-68 and accom-
panying text.
19. See McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd Royal), 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d
463 (1952). In McFall, the court held that the Belgian Line, which had failed to warn a third-
party of the dangers involved in loading drums of carbon tetrachloride, could be indemni-
fied by the party who loaded the drums negligently. See infra notes 141-55 and accompany-
ing text.
20. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a), (h) (1976). The defenses of discretionary function and
misrepresentation are referred to under these sections respectively and are discussed at infra
notes 114-39 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
23. "Free-form" wastes are those not contained in drums. Wastes are placed in drums
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to the Mayor and City Council of Niagara Falls,24 consulting engineers
commented that these practices continued in the absence of ordinances for
the regulation of industrial waste disposal into the city's sewage system.25
The high concentration of industrial wastes in the system,26 the unpleasant
odors, and the accompanying tear effects on sewage plant workers,27 how-
ever, led the engineers to recommend "[tjhat the City arrange conferences
with plants, individually and collectively, to discuss the data presented in
their report with a view specifically to . . . a better regulation of solids,
acidity, and alkalinity, and the elimination of objectionable odors. 28
The city granted Hooker Chemical Company permission to begin dis-
posing chemical residue from their production plants at the Love Canal
site in 1942. From that time until 1952, Hooker allegedly disposed of more
than 21,000 tons of chemical wastes at that site.29 In 1947, Hooker
purchased a 200-foot wide portion of the site for the purpose of dumping
only for the disposer's handling ease. The drums are not expected to prevent leakage for an
extended period of time. See Disposal Hearings, supra note 1, at 501.
24. Havens & Emerson, Survey of Industrial Wastes Discharged into the Sewerage Sys-
tem ofNiagara Falls, Report to the Hon. Mayor and Council, New York (Nov. 1940) [here-
inafter cited as Havens & Emerson].
25. Niagara Falls, New York, was certainly not the only city which suffered from lack
of solid waste disposal legislation. Prior to the mid 1960's, waste management regulations
consisted primarily of general health and safety ordinances applied to waste disposal sites.
Less than half of the cities and towns in the United States with populations greater than
2,500 had programs for sanitary disposal of solid waste. Kovacs & Klucsik, The New Federal
Role in Solid Waste Management The R. CR.A. of 1976, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 213
(1977). Even in 1970, state laws concerning the various types of solid waste were fragmented
and codified under various sections of each state code. For a comprehensive list of the sec-
tions of each of the 50 state's codes which pertain to solid wastes, see Autocomp, Inc., Solid
Waste Laws in the United States, Territories (1970).
26. The report by Havens & Emerson, consulting engineers, states:
With an estimated tributary population of 80,000 persons, the flow at the sewage
plant evaluates to 990 gallons per capita per day, or about six to ten times that
ordinarily found at municipal sewage works .... Among the industries contribut-
ing to the largest volume of wastes may be mentioned Hooker Electro-Chemical
Co., the Mathieson Alkali Works, Inc., R. & H. Chemicals Department of DuPont,
Kimberly-Clark Corp. and Union Carbide Co.
The municipal sewage plant is in reality for the most part, an industrial wastes
disposal plant, since, 81.2 per cent of the total flow and 90.25 per cent of the total
suspended solids received, are contributed by the industrial wastes.
Havens & Emerson, supra note 24, at x, xii.
27. The engineers' report states that the gases which produce tears are of sufficient in-
tensity at times to seriously affect the operator's working efficiency but cautiously notes,
"[A]s to the effect on health, that is more a question for the physician than for the Engineer."
Id at 26.
28. Id.
29. Complaint of plaintiff at 12-13, United States v. Hooker Chem. and Plastics Co.,
No. 79-990 (W.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 20, 1979).
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wastes.3" The Niagara Board of Education discussed with Hooker the
Board's expectation of future residential development surrounding the
Love Canal site in 1952. The Board of Education urged Hooker Chemical
to sell them its portion of the Love Canal site and adjacent property so that
a school could be built. The company allegedly warned the school board
against construction in the area.
When it became apparent to Hooker that the Board would acquire the
property through condemnation proceedings, the company deeded the
property to the Board for one dollar consideration, with a proviso dis-
claiming liability for any injuries from the chemicals.32 Once it became the
owner of the property, the Niagara Board of Education built its elemen-
tary school on property adjoining the central section of the canal site.
Later, the Board built a playground over the central portion of the canal
which had not been used to dump chemical wastes, but which had been
filled with municipal refuse, fly ash, and cinders. By 1964, there were more
than 150 homes in the area, and by 1976, the number had increased to
200.
3 3
Although the problem of chemical seepage was not greatly publicized
prior to 1976, Love Canal residents had reported injuries from the chemi-
30. See DISPOSAL HEARINGS, supra note 1, at 489 (testimony of Bruce D. Davis, Execu-
tive Vice President, Industrial Chemicals Group, Hooker Chemical Co.). From 1942 to 1947,
Hooker utilized the northern section of the Love Canal site, and, from 1947 to 1952, Hooker
disposed of its chemicals in the southern section of the site:
The practice employed by Hooker was to take the chemical residue materials from
its operation and stage [sic] it at the plant property until they had an adequate
amount of materials in drums. They then transported that material up to the canal
site, excavated an additional 10-15 feet of clay from the bottom of the canal site,
disposed of the drums in that minivault that had been constructed, and then cov-
ered the drums with approximately four feet of clay.
Id at 489.
31. Id
32. Id at 502. The deed contained this clause:
Prior to the delivery of this instrument of conveyance, the grantee herein has been
advised by the grantor that the premises above described have been filled, in whole
or in part, to the present grade level thereof with waste products resulting from the
manufacturing of chemicals . . . [and] the grantee assumes all risk and liability
incident to the use thereof. It is, therefore, understood and agreed that, as a part of
the consideration for this conveyance and as a condition thereof, no claim, suit,
action or demand of any nature whatsoever shall ever be made by the grantee, its
successors or assigns, against the grantor, its successors or assigns, for injury to a
person or persons, including death resulting therefrom or loss of damage to prop-
erty caused by, in connection with or by reason of the presence of said industrial
wastes. It is further agreed as a condition thereof that each subsequent conveyance
of the aforesaid lands shall be made subject to the foregoing provisions and
conditions.
33. Id at 504.
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cals as early as 1958 .3 In 1978, preliminary reports suggesting a link be-
tween the chemicals and incidences of disease prompted both local and
national concern. Pursuant to an act of the New York State Legislature, 5
over 200 families were evacuated from the area by 1979.36 On May 21,
1980, in response to uncertainty over the health and welfare of remaining
residents, President Jimmy Carter declared a state of emergency in the
Love Canal area and ordered the evacuation of families from 710 homes
surrounding the Love Canal site.3 7
II. LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL TORT THEORIES IN HAZARDOUS
WASTE PLAINTIFFS' SUITS AGAINST THE DISPOSERS
Negligence and private nuisance theories have been criticized as inade-
quate vehicles to allow hazardous waste victims to impose liability on pol-
luters and disposers."8 There are three theories of liability available to a
plaintiff under a private nuisance cause of action. A plaintiff can allege
that the defendant's conduct: (1) intentionally invades the plaintiffs inter-
ests; (2) negligently interferes with his interests; or (3) is abnormal and out
of place in its surroundings and so falls fairly within the principle of strict
34. Id at 665 (testimony of Mr. Wilkenfeld, Hooker Chemical Co.). In 1958, two chil-
dren who were walking over the site heard loud popping noises which became louder and
more frequent. The chemicals which were released from this "popping" action spread up
their legs and bodies and necessitated hospital treatment for chemical bums. Mr. Wilkenfeld
testified that parents would regularly call the nurses on duty at the Hooker dispensary to
request medical advice for treating their children who had come into contact with the chemi-
cals. Id at 665. One mother of five children recalled, "The boys used to play on the baseball
diamond beside the school and this bluish-blackish stuff would ooze up through the
ground." See Kittle, supra note 2, at 32.
35. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1388 (McKinney Supp. 1981). That section provides:
In case of great and imminent peril to the health of the general public from such
hazards as may be identified as resulting from exposure to toxic substances ema-
nating from landfills, the commissioner may declare the existence of an emergency
and take such measures and do such acts as he may deem reasonably necessary and
proper for the preservation and protection of the public health.
36. See [1979] 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 905.
37. See [1980] 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 139.
38. See, e.g., Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution through the Assertion of Private
Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126, 1130-38, 1142-48; Milhollin, Long-Term Liabilityfor Environ-
mental Harm, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 1-12 (1979); Sobel, A Proposalfor the Administrative
Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution." A Mode/Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
683, 703-09 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Proposal]; Comment, Private Actionsfor Damages
Resultingfrom Offshore Oil Pollution, 2 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 140 (1975); Comment, Liability
for Generators of Hazardous Waste. The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69
GEO. L.J. 1047, 1058-65 (1981); Note, Strict Liabilityfor Generators, Transporters, and Dis-
posers of Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949, 960-67 (1980); Note, The Viability of
Common Law Actionsfor Pollution Caused Injuries and Proof of Facts, 18 N.Y.L.F. 935, 940-
45, 946-48 (1973).
[Vol. 31:273
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liability.39 A hazardous waste plaintiff could frame his action within the
first or second theory.40
To maintain an action against a disposer for a private nuisance from an
intentional interference, a hazardous waste plaintiff must allege that the
disposer has substantially and unreasonably interfered with his interests in
the use and enjoyment of his land. Proving the elements of substantiality
and unreasonableness, however, presents special problems for such plain-
tiffs. Although a plaintiff may allege in a private nuisance action that a
polluter has substantially interfered with his interests,4 ' measuring the
amount of harm done to health and property by a particular hazardous
substance is often difficult.42 Moreover, plaintiffs who allege an intentional
interference with their interests in land must also demonstrate that a pol-
luters' activity is unreasonable.43 Courts determine the reasonableness of
an activity by balancing the harm to the plaintiff against the benefit of the
defendant's activity. 4 Under the reasonableness approach, a court might
find that the utility of defendant's activity outweighs the harm suffered by
the plaintiff and consider the pollution a necessary, albeit unfortunate, de-
39. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 87 (4th ed. 1971). At § 88,
Prosser distinguishes a private nuisance from a public nuisance in a particularly relevant
analogy: "Thus the pollution of a stream which merely inconveniences a number of riparian
owners is a private nuisance only, but it may become a public one if it kills the fish." The
analogy demonstrates that a public nuisance is one which interferes with the community's
exercise of its interests in general. Thus, the theory of public nuisance is especially appropri-
ate for a suit by the United States against waste disposers. See infra notes 156-62 and accom-
panying text. In the same section, Prosser notes that if an action can be maintained both as a
private and public nuisance, it often is preferable to bring it under a public nuisance since
prescriptive rights, laches and the statutes of limitations do not run against it. See also Pros-
ser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).
40. A plaintiff can allege that a defendant has intentionally interfered with his interests
if he can demonstrate that the defendant knew that his conduct was resulting, or was likely
to result, in an invasion of plaintiffs interests. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825
(1977). When a plaintiff frames his action within the second theory, that of a negligent inter-
ference, he must also demonstrate that the defendant's activity constitutes an unreasonable
interference with his interests. W. PROSSER, supra note 39, at § 87. Where there is an inten-
tional interference, a plaintiff may maintain a cause of action if the defendant's conduct is
unreasonable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972). Cf. 44
BROOKLYN L. REV. 703, 706 (1978) (author suggests that in ruling on intentional nuisance
cases, the courts will only allow plaintiff recovery if the gravity of the harm outweighs the
utility of the defendant's activity). See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 39, at § 88.
42. See Note, Private Nuisance Law. Protection of the Individual's Environmental Rights,
8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1162 (1974); Milhollin, Long-term Liability for Environmental Harm,
41 U. PI-r. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976).
43. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 1.24 (1956) notes that the "unreasonable
harm to others. . . constitutes a private nuisance for which damages are recoverable.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977).
44. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 43, at 73.
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rivative of the defendant's activity.45
In contrast, to maintain a suit against disposers based on negligence, a
plaintiff must demonstrate the forseeability of the harm resulting from the
disposal activity and establish that the disposed chemicals caused plain-
tiffs' injuries. In hazardous waste suits brought to recover for injuries alleg-
edly due from dumping over thirty years ago, it may be difficult to
establish that defendants should have foreseen the hazards of their dispo-
sal activity.46 Disposers can be expected to raise the traditional argument
that their activities were conducted in conformity with the current state of
the art.47 The knowledge of the danger of disposal methods then in prac-
tice, however, might arguably be imputed to the United States which, pur-
suant to the Public Health Service Act of 1944, charged itself with the duty
of investigating this area.48
Plaintiffs seeking to recover under a negligence theory also face the
problem of establishing legal causation. This was demonstrated in the case
of Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA ,49 where the court held, even after receiving
an abundance of scientific testimony, that it could not know definitely
whether the pollution particles caused residents' diseases. One author has
suggested that judges who are faced with cases where such scientific evi-
dence is necessarily presented will be tempted to gloss over scientific data
which reaches different conclusions in a quest for the more familiar models
of the reasonableness and balancing tests.50 Continual resort to such mod-
els without grappling with difficult scientific and policy questions could
result in a failure to impose liability on the disposers.
45. See Note, The Viability of Common Law Actionsfor Pollution Caused Injuries and
Proof of Facts, 18 N.Y.L.F. 935, 943 (1973).
46. See Proposal, supra note 38, at 706; but cf, Note, supra note 45, at 947 (author states
that "[tihere is little difficulty in establishing knowledge of pollution dangers in industries
discharging harmful substances such as fluorides, cyanides, lead, free chlorine, and ber-
rylium, or arsenic. . . ."). Proof of this element would not be as insurmountable a barrier
in plaintiffs' suit against the United States because, arguably, the United States charged itself
with the duty of investigating this field pursuant to the Public Health Service Act of 1944
(PHSA). See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
47. See Proposal, supra note 38, at 705-06; but cf. infra note 186 and accompanying text
(New York courts have recognized that methods employed in any trade cannot establish, as
safe in law, that which is dangerous in fact).
48. The Public Health Service Act of 1944 (PHSA), ch. 376, § 301, 58 Stat. 691 (1944)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1976)).
49. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (suit by residents alleging their respiratory diseases
were caused by exposure to asbestos particles in air and water near Lake Superior in
Michigan).
50. Proposal, supra note 38, at 709.
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III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF UNITED STATES' RESPONSIBILITY FOR
HAZARDOUS WASTE INJURIES
A. The Federal Tort Claims Act
In the face of the legal obstacles involved in seeking recovery from the
disposers of chemical waste, the Love Canal plaintiffs may attempt to re-
cover for their injuries by establishing United States' liability to them
under the FTCA. The enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act5' in 1948
created a new forum for private suits against the United States. Despite the
waiver of sovereign immunity contemplated by the Act, there are substan-
tial limitations placed on the types of suits that may be maintained against
the United States. 2 Whether plaintiffs can successfully impose liability on
the United States is determined by the law of the state where the injury
occurred." If that state recognizes the legal theory upon which liability is
asserted, as well as a private citizen's liability to another for the same type
of act allegedly committed by the United States, then the United States
may be held liable.5 4 The FTCA expresses this concept by providing that
the United States shall be liable "in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances."55
B. Establishing a Gratuitous Undertaking Cause of Action
Under the FTCA
One tort theory of liability which has been successfully asserted against
the United States is the "gratuitous undertaking" theory. The theory is
embodied in section 323 of the Restatement of Torts.56 Since United
States' liability under the FTCA is always determined with reference to the
tort law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred, if a particular juris-
diction recognizes the "gratuitous undertaking" theory, plaintiffs suing in
51. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976). See generally L. JAYSON, PERSONAL INJURY: HAN-
DLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS (1981).
52. Meyers, Limitations and Exceptions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 5 GONZ. L.
REV. 175 (1970).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
54. United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 192-94 (9th Cir. 1980). For
example, § 323 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, or the "gratuitous undertaking"
doctrine, is recognized by many states. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 re-
porter's notes (1966). Therefore, plaintiffs suing in states which recognize this theory of lia-
bility may assert it in their FTCA suits. But see Mosley v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 671
(E.D. Tenn. 1978), where the wife of a decedent sued when her husband was killed in a mine
which was inspected by the United States. The court dismissed the suit because, under Ten-
nessee law, there was no similar duty imposed on a mine inspector.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). See supra note 18.
1982]
Catholic University Law Review
that jurisdiction can argue that theory against the United States. Signifi-
cantly, New York courts have recognized the gratuitous undertaking
theory.
57
In seeking to establish their prima facie case under section 323, all plain-
tiffs first must show that, by its activity, the United States intended to pro-
vide them with a direct service.58 Secondly, plaintiffs must show that they
relied on the United States' undertaking to their detriment,59 or, in the
alternative, that the undertaking increased their risk of harm.6" While the
United States is to be held liable to the same extent as a private individual,
in practice, federal courts that entertain FTCA suits often hold plaintiffs to
a more stringent demonstration of the elements of a "gratuitous undertak-
ing" than a state court would in imposing liability on a private individ-
ual.6 ' Once hazardous waste plaintiffs successfully allege a section 323
action against the United States, they then must meet and overcome the
affirmative defenses of the tolling of the statute of limitations,6 2 discretion-
ary function,6 3 and misrepresentation. 64
1. Direct Service
When a plaintiff seeks to impose liability on the United States under
section 323, courts have focused on the "rendering of services" language in
the foreword of that section. In alleging a section 323 suit against the
United States, a plaintiff first must demonstrate that, by its activity, the
United States intended to render a direct service to the victim. The United
States undertakes to provide services in the contracts it enters with certain
parties and, on a much larger scale, provides services pursuant to the regu-
lations and statutes it enacts. In either situation, where a beneficiary seeks
57. See, e.g., Kurzweg v. Hotel St. Regis Corp., 309 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1962); Zibbon v.
Town of Cheektowaga, 51 A.D.2d 448, 382 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1976); Marks v. Nambil Realty
Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 157 N.E. 129 (1927); Seigel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414
(1923); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
58. See supra note 18 and infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
61. One of the reasons courts dwell on this element may be due to their concern with
imposing extensive liability on the federal government. This concern was succinctly noted in
Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1150 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978):
[TJhere is a fine line but a vital and necessary one between the principle of holding
the government responsible for conduct by which it carries out its affairs when
federal employees negligently injure the public and the principle that the govern-
ment may be turned to as a final source of relief from the tragedies of life.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). See infra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
64. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). See infra notes 125-39
and accompanying text.
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to hold the United States liable, the court must determine the true intent
and extent of the United States' undertaking.
The United States can be found to render a direct service to individuals
where it specifically contracts to protect persons against injury or damages
and agrees to be responsible for damages caused by its failure to protect. In
Fentress v. United States,65 the United States contracted to provide such a
service to the employees of a construction company and was thus held
liable when it failed to provide adequate scaffolding.66 Where the United
States merely reserves the right to survey a construction project, however,
it does not undertake to provide a direct safety service. In Roberson v.
United States,67 for example, the United States obligated an independent
contractor, Merritt-Chapman and Scott (MCS), to provide for its employ-
ees' safety but reserved the right to survey the project to determine whether
MCS was complying with this obligation. The employees who fell from the
scaffolding sued the United States claiming that by reserving the right to
survey, the United States voluntarily assumed the duty of protecting them
while they worked on the scaffolding. Finding that the reservation of the
right to make safety inspections at the dam site was not a direct service to
the MCS employees, the court denied the plaintiffs recovery.68
Compared with reserving a right to inspect under one or more contracts,
the United States assumes a far greater undertaking when it imposes af-
firmative obligations on itself pursuant to federal statutes. Despite the
greater number of beneficiaries and greater potential for liability in this
latter type of undertaking, if the court finds that a statute required the
United States to provide a service, the United States may be held liable for
negligently performing the undertaking.
In Clemente v. United States69 and Raymer v. United States,7" plaintiffs
respectively claimed that undertakings by the United States pursuant to an
agency regulation and a federal statute demonstrated the United States'
intent to provide them with a direct service. Plaintiffs in Clemente were
denied recovery, while the Raymer court granted relief. Clemente involved
an airplane crash in which all the passengers were killed, including major
league baseball player Roberto Clemente. The First Circuit examined a
regulation promulgated pursuant to the Federal Aviation Authority's
(FAA) general grant of authority to provide for air traffic safety. The regu-
65. 431 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1970).
66. Id at 830.
67. 382 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967).
68. Id at 718. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69. 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
70. 482 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Ky. 1979).
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lation required FAA employees to warn passengers on private aircraft
when the aircraft was overweight or lacked a proper flight crew. 7' Rela-
tives and representatives of the passengers argued that the FAA regulation
established a duty, the breach of which would support a claim under the
FTCA. The court recognized that one of the purposes of the FAA was to
promote air travel safety. According to the court, however, this general
purpose would not support a finding that an internal regulation promul-
gated thereunder evidenced a legal duty to provide protective measures to
a particular class of passengers.72 Despite its holding under these facts, the
court declared that there could be no doubt that the mandate of a federal
statute was a far stronger foundation for the creation of an actionable duty
under the FTCA than the administrative directive at issue in the present
case.
73
In light of this appellate declaration, the subsequent Raymer court
found that the federal statutory mandate in the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act (FCMHSA) compelled it to impose liability on the United
States. The Raymer court compared the statutory language in the
FCMHSA with that of the FAA statutory language presented in Clemente.
Raymer reconciled the Clemente decision by finding that the statutory au-
thority of the FAA concerning the methods of implementing air travel
safety was discretionary 74 and thus fell short of the stringent demands of
the FCMHSA, which imposed a strict duty on the United States to protect
miners.75
Once a court determines that a federal statute was enacted for the bene-
fit of specific individuals, the FTCA requires that the court further deter-
mine whether an individual acting similarly to the United States would be
held to a duty to the beneficiary of that activity. 76 For example, in United
Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States,77 plaintiffs sought to premise the
United States' duty based on section 323. They claimed that had the FAA
completely and carefully performed its undertaking to inspect their air-
craft, the plane would not have crashed. The Ninth Circuit ruled that ab-
sent allegations by the plaintiffs or findings by the court that a good
samaritan action was recognized under state law, the district court would
have to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim under the FTCA.71
71. Order No. S08430.20C. See 567 F.2d 1140, 1146.
72. Id at 1145.
73. Id at 1150.
74. 482 F. Supp. 432, 436 (W.D. Ky. 1979).
75. Id at 436.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
77. 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1980).
78. Id at 199.
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To ensure that his claim passes this test, a Love Canal plaintiff who sues
the United States under the good samaritan theory in the federal district
court of New York must demonstrate that New York recognizes the good
samaritan theory. One of the unique values of this theory is that it may be
used to assert liability on negligent actors in a jurisdiction which may lack
on-point precedent for imposing such liability.79 In other words, a plaintiff
must show only that the state has previously imposed liability on an actor
who undertook to provide a benefit and then failed in that performance.
The plaintiff would not need to show that the state has previously imposed
liability on an actor undertaking the same type of service. New York has
recognized this theory of liability"0 and has stated that the lack of an on-
point precedent should not deter courts in imposing liability."'
The seminal New York case on the rendering of services element of the
gratuitous undertaking doctrine is H. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co. ,82 where a water company contracted with a municipality to provide it
with water for fire protection. Justice Cardozo articulated the key factor in
considering whether to impose liability under the "gratuitous undertak-
ing" doctrine. He stated, "If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that
inaction would commonly result not negatively merely in withholding a
benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists a rela-
tion out of which there arises a duty to go forward. 8 3 In finding that the
company, through its contract with the city, undertook to provide services
to residents in general, but did not assume a duty to residents individually,
the court demonstrated its reluctance to impose an undue and indefinite
79. This concept is elucidated in United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.
1960), where the United States was held liable for its failure to rescue the crew of a shrimper.
The court in Gayagan recognized,
[T]o the extent that the activity is the same as that normally done by private per-
sons the law (here the maritime law on salvage) would control. To the extent, how-
ever, that it is different then the case does not fail because of a void in legal
precedents. The court trying the case has the obligation to determine an appropri-
ate standard for what the law would be were there such a private person perform-
ing the unusual function.
Id at 327.
80. See, e.g., Kurzweg v. Hotel St. Regis Corp., 309 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1962); Zibbon v.
Town of Cheektowaga, 51 A.D.2d 448, 382 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1976); Marks v. Nambil Realty
Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 157 N.E. 129 (1927); Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414
(1923); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
81. In Schwartz v, Greenfield, Stein and Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582
(S. Ct. 1977), the court imposed liability on an attorney who volunteered to perfect a security
agreement but failed to do so, and thereby lost a security interest of a client. Applying the
"gratuitous undertaking" theory, the court imposed liability, although there was no exact
precedent for doing so under the facts presented.
82. 247 N.Y. 160, 167, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928).
83. Id. at 167, 159 N.E. at 898.
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extension of the zone of duty.8 4
While New York has exhibited some hesitancy in imposing liability on
public organizations, it has not exhibited this hesitancy where a single in-
dividual undertakes to provide a service.8 5 Since the United States' liabil-
ity must be judged with regard to the liability of a private individual in the
forum state, rather than a municipality or public organization, this recog-
nition of private liability in New York would be of great benefit to a Love
Canal plaintiff.
2. Detrimental Reliance
The reliance element is a integral part of the "gratuitous undertaking"
analysis 6 and requires, at minimum, proof that a party acted or refrained
from acting with conscious reference to the action or inaction of others.
87
The landmark case on the reliance element is Indian Towing Co. v. United
States."8 In that case, the Coast Guard was operating a lighthouse which
failed to transmit its light due to the negligence of Coast Guard personnel
in maintaining the lighthouse. As a result of this negligence, a freighter ran
aground and its cargo was damaged. The court recognized that the United
States' undertaking to operate a lighthouse was a discretionary function,89
and that the government's subsequent failure to keep the lighthouse work-
ing was a negligent act for which the United States could be liable. As the
court noted,
84. Id at 168, 159 N.E. at 899.
85. See, e.g., Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 157 N.E. 129 (1929); Schwartz
v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1977).
86. United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 195 (9th Cir. 1980).
87. See, e.g., Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Cal., 1981) (crew
of S.S. Mayaguez, a private cargo vessel, was seized by Cambodian gunboats on May 12,
1975. Plaintiffs alleged that the United States had information about prior attacks by
Cambodian gunboats but failed to show that they relied on the absence of a communication
before proceeding in the area).
88. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). The FTCA allows for a general waiver by the United
States of its sovereign immunity. The Act does, however, provide that sovereign immunity
shall be maintained for certain acts. These acts are referred to as exceptions to the Act.
Section 2680(a) provides that:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to (a)
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.
For further discussion of the important discretionary function exception, see infra notes 1 14-
24 and accompanying text.
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The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But
once it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur
Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the
light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the
light was kept in good working order; and, if the light did become
extinguished, then the Coast Guard was further obligated to use
due care to discover this fact and to repair the light or give warn-
ing that it was not functioning. If the Coast Guard failed in its
duty and damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the United
States is liable under the Tort Claims Act. 90
New York holds a comparable view of this element. In Zibbon v. Town
of Cheektowaga,9 a New York court found detrimental reliance by vic-
tims of threats of personal violence, who had been assured of adequate
police protection. Plaintiffs relied on these assurances and were harmed by
their reliance when the police withdrew protection without informing
them. When reliance is engendered, but there occurs a subsequent with-
drawal of the service, a breach of the duty to provide the service occurs
and liability may be imposed under section 323.92
3. Increased Risk of Harm.- The "Worsening of Position" Element
As an alternative to a showing of detrimental reliance, courts will re-
quire proof that the defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care in the
performance of the undertaking has increased the risk of harm to another.
Two maritime cases succinctly illustrate how courts have applied the in-
creased risk of harm issue. United States v. Gavagan93 involved a federal
undertaking pursuant to the 1956 National Search and Research Plan
(NSAR). This plan was established pursuant to the Specific Recommenda-
tion No. 2 of the Civil Air Policy of May 1954. 94 In Gavagan, the Coast
Guard began a rescue of a disabled shrimper. Directors of the search on
90. 350 U.S. at 69.
91. 51 A.D.2d 448, 382 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1976); but cf. Stranger v. New York State Elec.
and Gas Corp., 25 A.D.2d 169, 268 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1966). In Stranger, housing inspectors
notified the owner and lessee of a building that if they failed to replace an unvented portable
gas heater, their building would be condemned. The residents continued to use the heater,
but the building was not condemned as threatened. When the heater exploded and burned
the building, the lessee sued for personal injuries and property damage, claiming that the
corporation was negligent in not condemning their building. The court did not hold New
York State Electric and Gas liable because the leasee did not rely on the corporation's in-
spection acts to their detriment. Id at 173, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
92. Zibbon, 51 A.D.2d at 453, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
93. 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960).
94. The Civil Air Policy, May 1954, at 44 states its purpose: "To provide an over-all
Search and Rescue Plan (SAR) for effective utilization of all available facilities to include
provisions for the control and coordination of all types of Search and Rescue."
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land called off the rescue attempt, however, based on erroneous reports
that the shrimper was in no danger. The Fifth Circuit found that the facts
of the case fully met the requirements of section 323.9' Even though the
Coast Guard undertook the rescue attempt pursuant to a statute, the
shrimper's crew and other private boaters in the vicinity relied on the ex-
pertise of the Coast Guard in leading the rescue. Because of this reliance,
private boaters had not made independent attempts to rescue the
shrimper. 9
6
Two years later in United States v. DeVane,97 a case factually similar to
Gavagan and involving a NSAR by the Coast Guard, the Fifth Circuit
clarified the rationale of the holding in Gavagan. The lower court in
DeVane had failed to make a finding on the issue of whether the victim's
position had worsened as a result of the undertaking. The district court
based the United States' liability solely on its affirmative duty under the
plan and disregarded the plaintiffs worsening of position in determining
liability for negligence. 98 The appellate court concluded that a finding on
both issues is necessary. The court explained that although the decision to
undertake or abandon a rescue effort is within the Coast Guard's discre-
tion, once the undertaking has engendered reliance, negligence in the oper-
ation would create liability if it was the proximate cause of loss or damage
to one whose position had worsened in reliance on the undertaking.99
The cases of Zibbon v. Town of Cheektowaga and Nallan v. Helmsley-
Spear, Inc. '0 demonstrate how the risk of harm element has been consid-
ered in New York. In Zibbon, the court found that the police department's
promises to protect the plaintiffs had actually increased plaintiffs' risk of
harm because the plaintiffs had been lulled into a false sense of security
and, as a result, had taken no steps to ensure their safety."°2 In Nallan, a
union official was shot in the lobby of a midtown hotel as he signed in the
hotel's register. The desk attendant was not at his station when the incident
occured. At trial, the victim argued that the defendant's employment of a
desk attendant represented an undertaking, within the meaning of section
323, to provide protective services to the building's tenants and their
guests. The appellate court instructed that plaintiffs mere assertion that
the hotel commenced an undertaking would not subject the defendant to
95. 280 F.2d at 328.
96. Id
97. 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962).
98. Id at 186.
99. Id
100. 51 A.D.2d 448, 382 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1976).
101. 50 N.Y.2d 507, 407 N.E.2d 451, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1980).
102. 51 A.D.2d at 453, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
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liability for temporarily withdrawing or negligently performing these serv-
ices.'0 3 In remanding the case, the appellate court suggested that the plain-
tiff would have to further argue that the hotel's undertaking placed him in
a more vulnerable position than if the hotel had not placed an attendant
on duty.'0
To demonstrate the increased risk of harm element, a Love Canal plain-
tiff would have to make a similar argument. He would allege that by un-
dertaking responsibility to supervise, investigate and study the waste
disposal problem and then not adequately performing this undertaking,
residents near disposal sites were persuaded that they were in no danger
from the chemical dumping and, therefore, took no steps to ensure their
safety.
C. United States' Defenses under the FTCA
In addition to ensuring that they have properly alleged the United
States' liability under section 323, Love Canal plaintiffs, as well as other
FTCA plaintiffs, must avoid certain defenses which the United States has
successfully asserted to preclude recovery under the Act.
L Statute of Limitations
The Federal Tort Claims Act prescribes a single statute of limitations
period for all plaintiffs' and, thus, dispenses with the need to refer to a
particular state's limitations statute."° The FTCA's establishment of a sin-
103. 50 N.Y.2d at 522, 407 N.E.2d at 459, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
104. Id at 522, 407 N.E.2d at 460, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). The section states:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented
in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim
accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by
certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to
which it was presented.
106. The question of when a claim accrues under the Act is one of federal law. Kossick v.
United States, 330 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1964). This is beneficial to plaintiffs whose claims may
be barred under state determination of when a claim accrues. Among other states, New
York holds that the date on which a tort action accrues, for purposes of commencing the
limitations period, is the date when a plaintiff is injured. This formula works well when the
injury results from a sudden, definite act but is unfavorable to plaintiffs injured by latent
disease. See Note, Accrual Dilemma: Statutes of Limitations in Hazardous Waste Cases, 45
ALBANY L. REV. 717 (1981); Victims of diethylstilbestrol (DES) also face the delayed mani-
festation of injury problem. See, Note, Delayed Manfestation Injuries: The Statute of Limita-
tions as a Bar to DES Suits, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 127 (1980). In Thornton v.
Roosevelt Hospital, 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979), the court
held that a plaintiff's cause of action for cancer accrued when she received her first injection
of thorium dioxide, even though the cancer allegedly caused by this drug did not manifest
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gle statute of limitations, in addition to the Supreme Court's rulings on the
accrual of a claim issue under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA)1°7 and the FTCA, °8 assists plaintiffs whose claims would be
barred under more stringent state laws.
The Supreme Court has addressed the perplexing issue of establishing
when an injury accrues in Urie v. Thompson,1°9 a latent disease case, and
in Kubrick v. United States,"' where a plaintiffs hearing loss was due to
prior improper neomycin treatment. By foregoing a simple, yet mechani-
cal, accrual rule in both cases, the result was more accommodating to the
plaintiffs, neither of whose injuries were immediately apparent. In Urie, a
plaintiff claimed that exposure to silica dust for a period of twenty-eight
years caused him to contract silicosis, a slowly-debilitating lung disease.
The Supreme Court held that to require Urie to bring his FELA suit
within three years after his first exposure to a substance he was unaware
was injuring him "would constitute [a] waiver of his right to compensation
at the ultimate day of discovery and disability.""' Demonstrating its rec-
ognition of the distinction between injury from a sudden act and injury
which arises slowly, the Court noted that "the injurious consequences of
the exposure are the product of a period of time rather than a point of
time; consequently the afflicted employee can be held to be 'injured' only
when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest
themselves." " 2
In United States v. Kubrick,' ' the Supreme Court determined that the
accrual of an FTCA claim for a veteran who had been improperly treated
with neomycin occured on the date that he knew both of the existence and
the cause of his injury. This ruling curtailed the Third Circuit's extension
of the accrual period to the date on which the plaintiff realized that a negli-
gent act caused his injury. The Supreme Court's holding required Kubrick
to determine whether an act of negligence caused his injury on the accrual
date. Although the Supreme Court declined to push the statute of limita-
itself until 20 years later. Thus, it appears that application of the New York date of injury
rule to a Love Canal plaintiff who claims that exposure to hazardous wastes has caused his
disease would automatically bar his claim if the period of exposure commenced more than
three years before he contracted the disease.
107. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
108. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-6978 (1976).
109. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
110. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
111. Urie, 337 U.S. at 170 (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 124 Cal. App. 378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1932)).
112. 337 U.S. at 170.
113. 444 U.S. 111 (1979), rev'g, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 31:273
Liability for Hazardous Wastes
tions deadline as far as the Third Circuit had deemed appropriate, its will-
ingness to delay accrual of the claim until a plaintiff has knowledge of his
injury demonstrates the continued vitality of the reasoning espoused in
Urie. The Court demonstrated that at the base of its acceptance of the
"discovery" approach was a concern for the unjustness of charging a plain-
tiff with knowledge of an injury before that injury is manifested. While
Kubrick concerned medical malpractice, it is clear that these same mani-
festation problems face both medical malpractice and hazardous waste vic-
tims alike. Thus, the FTCA provides a more sympathetic forum for these
plaintiffs than would a state court applying the stringent date of exposure
rule. Under the FTCA, the day that the victims of hazardous wastes have
both the knowledge of their diagnoses and knowledge that laboratory tests
reveal the presence of maximum levels of certain chemicals in their bodies
should be the date on which their injuries accrue.
2 Discretionary Function
If the plaintiff is successful in arguing the threshold statute of limitations
issue, he may then expect to confront the discretionary function defense.
The affirmative defense of discretionary function" 4 has been the govern-
ment's most successful tool in precluding its liability under the FTCA." 5
Under this defense, the United States is not liable for negligent acts or
omissions based upon the exercise of a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or employee. Although the FTCA fails to de-
fine "discretionary function," courts have drawn the distinction between
governmental activity at the policy or planning level and at the operational
level. " 6 Activity at the former stage involves discretion and therefore pre-
cludes liability; negligence at the latter, operational stage, may be the basis
for finding the United States liable." 7
The discretionary function defense was well-articulated in a FTCA
claim arising from a disasterous explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). See supra notes 86 & 89.
115. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Blessing v. United States,
447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
116. For a thorough discussion of this "planning level--operational level" test, see Com-
ment, Federal Tort Claims.: A Critique of the Planning Level-Operational Level Test,
U.S.F.L. REV. 170 (1976).
117. In construing the meaning of a discretionary act, the federal district court in Bless-
ing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978), noted, as an example, that victims of
flooding from backed-up waters of a federal dam would not be able to sue the United States
based solely on the government's decision to implement the dam project. Id at 1170 n.14.
The court stated that this is the type of decision which is discretionary and which is ex-
empted as a basis for imposing liability on the United States under the FTCA.
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produced as part of the United States government's fertilizer export pro-
gram. In Dalehite v. United States," 8 men who were loading this fertilizer
on ships bound for Japan and Germany were killed when explosives
stored on the ships reacted with the nitrate and caused a fire. Plaintiffs
sued the United States for negligence under the FTCA, seeking recovery
for the death of a worker caused by the explosion. The plaintiffs premised
the government's liability upon the participation of the United States in
the manufacture and transportation of the fertilizer. Focusing upon the
discretionary function exception, the Supreme Court denied recovery. The
Court held that the discretionary function exception was more encompass-
ing than the mere initiation of programs and activities and included deter-
minations made by executives "in establishing plans, specifications, or
schedules of operations.""' 9 The Court noted that "[w]here there is room
for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows
that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in
accordance with official directions cannot be actionable."2 The Court
further cautioned that if subordinates' acts in implementing high-level pol-
icy decisions could be the basis for liability, "the protection of section
2680(a) would fail at the time it would be most needed, that is when a
subordinate performs or fails to perform a casual step, each action or non-
action being directed by the supervisor, exercising, perhaps abusing,
discretion." 2'
Even though an initial policy decision or a plan adopted pursuant to
that decision may be discretionary, the government cannot remain im-
mune if it negligently performs an activity. In Indian Towing Co. v. United
States,"'22 a section 323 case, the Supreme Court defined the point beyond
which the government could not claim immunity. In Indian Towing, the
government voluntarily decided to operate a lighthouse. Vessels which had
come to rely on the lighthouse for direction were damaged when the gov-
ernment failed to keep the lighthouse operating. The Court defined the
government's initial policy decision to operate the lighthouse as one which
involved discretion. The protection of the discretionary function defense
could not extend, however, to protect the United States when it was subse-
quently negligent in implementing the decision.' 23 The United States
would therefore be liable for damage resulting from its failure to perform
118. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
119. Id at 35-36.
120. Id at 36.
121. Id
122. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See also supra notes 88-90.
123. Id at 67.
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its undertaking with due care.' 24
To overcome the discretionary function defense, a Love Canal plaintiff
needs to stress the operational negligence of the United States in failing to
carry out the duties which it imposed on itself under the Public Service Act
of 1944. Premising liability solely on the United States' decision to enact
legislation concerning waste disposal is insufficient to overcome this de-
fense. A Love Canal plaintiff must stress the subsequent failure of the
United States to perform its undertaking with care.
3. Misrepresentation
Another defense which has been asserted by the government in FTCA
suits is framed under the theory of misrepresentation.' 25 This theory
shields the United States from liability where the tort arises not from an
employee's conduct but from an employee's spoken word or failure to
speak, ' 26 upon which another party relies and accordingly alters their con-
duct. The United States has argued this defense when plaintiffs seek to
hold it liable when it has reported its findings, 27 certified a product as
safe,'12 and failed to warn.' 29 Because the government engages in a myriad
124. In Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976), the court recognized that
the discretionary function defense could be used by the United States in almost any circum-
stance. There, the court found the defense inapplicable and granted relief to a burned child's
family. The child and his family had been visiting Yellowstone Park when he fell into a
superheated, thermal pool. The family had just visited a developed area of the park where
they had been given informational pamphlets warning them about bears and geothermal
pools. The family read the bear brochure but neglected to read the latter brochure. In the
developed area, park officials had posted signs telling visitors to stay on the boardwalks and
had roped off the geothermal pools. The tragedy occurred later when the family visited an
undeveloped area which contained no warning signs and in which the geothermal pools
were not roped off. The United States claimed that it should not be liable to the plaintiffs for
their son's injuries since the park's decision to keep some areas undeveloped and without
directional signs was a discretionary decision implementing a congressional policy to con-
serve the scenery. The appellate court concluded that while this was a valid policy decision,
"it does not follow that the Government, as a landowner, is absolved of all duty under state
law to erect safety devices or signs cautioning about conditions which have been left undis-
turbed as a policy matter." Id at 877. The court further noted that "if we were to accept the
Government's broad interpretation of the discretionary exception, it is difficult to perceive
which duties under tort law could not be avoided by a similar policy decision to ignore
them." Id
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). The section states: "The provisions of this chapter and
section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to . . . (h) Any claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-
der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights ....
126. Wenninger v. United States, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965), aftg, 234 F. Supp. 499 (D.
Del. 1964).
127. Knudsen v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
128. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
129. Wenninger, 234 F. Supp. at 505.
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of undertakings in which it inspects, certifies and issues warnings, the mis-
representation exception is a widespread shield from many potential
lawsuits.
In United States v. Neustadt, 3° purchasers of a house relied on the Fed-
eral Housing Authority's (FHA) appraisal and paid in excess of its fair
market value. They then sought to recover from the United States under
the FTCA the difference between the fair market and appraisal values.
Reversing the two lower courts, the Supreme Court found this situation to
be covered by the misrepresentation exception. The Court acknowledged
that where there is any statute which requires disclosure, it "may be said
that the Government owes a 'specific duty' to obtain and communicate
information carefully. . . .While we do not condone carelessness by gov-
ernment employees in gathering and promulgating such information,
neither can we justifiably ignore the plain words . . . of Section 2680(h)
... ,,"I The Court cautioned that its holding did not conflict with Indian
Towing Co. v. United States 3' because, in that case, the government's neg-
ligent failure to maintain the beacon lamp in a lighthouse resulted from
negligent operations or conduct and was, therefore, distinguishable from
the situation in Neustadt where the tort was a communication of incorrect
information. 33
Addressing the distinction between negligent conduct and misrepresen-
tation, the district court, in Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc. ,134 deemed that
case to be a classic example of injury resulting from reliance on a misrep-
resentation. In Marival, airplane buyers relied on a certificate of airworthi-
ness prepared by an inspector of the FAA and sued when they discovered
the plane was in fact not airworthy. The court determined that what had
injured the purchasers was their reliance on the certificate; if they had not
relied on the certificate, the negligence of the inspector would not have
caused them any injury. 13
In Wenninger v. United States,36 there was both negligent conduct and a
misrepresentation, but the court found that plaintiffs injury flowed from
the former. In Wenniger, the Air Force failed to warn a pilot of turbulence
in an area in which he was flying, and he was killed when his plane could
130. 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
131. Id at 710-11.
132. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
133. 366 U.S. at 711 n.26.
134. 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
135. Id at 860.
136. 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965), affg mem., 234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964).
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not negotiate the turbulence. On the Air Force's failure to warn, the court
commented, "A failure to warn of an existing danger, when a duty to do so
exists, is in a sense an implicit assertion that there is no danger. For some
purposes, at least, this may properly be characterized as a misrepresenta-
tion."' 37 However, this lack of warning was more akin to a negligent fail-
ure to act, and thus the court concluded that this was not a mis-
representation which section 2680(h) was intended to cover.138
These cases demonstrate that if a plaintiff alleges that his injuries result
from reliance on a statement or absence of a statement, courts will be
likely to find the misrepresentation defense applicable. The United States
can be expected to raise the misrepresentation exception whenever a plain-
tiff claims that the United States failed to disclose or supplied false infor-
mation on which a plaintiff relied. To prevent a court from finding this
defense applicable, a plaintiff must argue that his injury resulted from neg-
ligent conduct. This exception is, therefore, one a Love Canal plaintiff
must be aware of when he seeks to establish the United States' duty to
disclose the dangers of hazardous waste disposal under the Public Health
Service Act of 1944.139 To overcome this defense, a Love Canal plaintiff
must stress that his injury results from improper disposal practices which
were sanctioned by the United States and not from the United States' fail-
ure to warn them that the disposal practices were improper.
D. The United States' Suit Against a Disposer
I. Negligence Theory
The FTCA not only mandates that United States' liability shall be that
of a private tort defendant"4 but also provides that the United States may
be able to file third party claims for indemnity against parties who share its
culpability. 4 ' The right of the government to bring a third party indem-
137. 234 F. Supp. at 505.
138, Id In a somewhat elusive manner, the court supported this conclusion by relying
upon guidance provided by the Supreme Court in United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. at 711
n.26.
139, The Public Health Service Act of 1944, ch. 376, § 301, 58 Stat. 691 (1944) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1976)). The United States' liability will have to be determined
with reference to the sewage and waste disposal statutory provisions in effect at the time the
original injurious dumping took place.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976).
141. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 51, § 164 at 5230 & n.13. See, e.g., United States v. Illinois,
454 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972). Plaintiffs sued the United
States under the FTCA for injuries sustained when a catwalk fell at the Green Berets' dem-
onstration. The United States brought a third party action against the State of Illinois for
indemnity. The court found that a third party claim brought by the United States was
proper under Rule 14. The court applied Illinois law and allowed United States to recover
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nity action in a suit where a plaintiff premises United States liability on a
negligently performed "gratuitous undertaking" has been recognized by
the courts, at least in dicta. In Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 42 a govern-
ment air traffic controller failed to warn a landing commercial airplane
about certain hazardous weather conditions. The court found that even
though the government's failure to provide necessary weather information
set in motion a chain of events that resulted in the deaths of twenty-five
individuals, the airplane crew was partially responsible because it negli-
gently approached the runway. Although the court recognized the govern-
ment's right to indemnification, the court held that because the two parties
could be found equally blameworthy, the United States was not entitled to
indemnity. 43
Since the rights of the United States under the FTCA are to be the same
as that of a private individual under similar circumstances, '" the common
law of the state where the United States wishes to be indemnified must be
reviewed to determine whether indemnity is recognized and how the
United States must plead its right to indemnity. 45 New York allows in-
demnity between joint tort-feasors as long as the party seeking indemnifi-
cation proves the passive nature of its own negligence and the active
nature of the negligence of the party from whom it requests
indemnification. 4
6
New York has determined that passive negligence includes a failure to
warn. 147 In McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge,148 the Belgian Line
chartered a vessel on which a third party was to load drums of carbon
tetrachloride. The drums were stored in the bottom of the ship; when one
longshoreman went down into the hull, he was overcome by fumes from
the leaking drums. The court found that the Belgian Line should have
warned the longshoremen of the properties of the gas or should have cau-
tioned them to employ special care in handling the drums. The court real-
indemnity because it demonstrated its passive negligence and Illinois' active negligence. Cf
United States v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 612 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980) (after plaintiff
obtained judgment against United States under FTCA for damages to automobile resulting
from negligence of one of its employees, the United States sued the employee's insurer to
recover amount of property damage to vehicle struck by employee).
142. 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
143. Id at 240.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
145. Principe v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 301 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Santomassino v.
United States, 157 F. Supp. 826 (N.D.N.Y. 1957); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige,
304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
146. Kantlehner v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).




ized that even though such a warning might not have prevented the
careless handling, one could find that the failure to warn played an impor-
tant role in causing the accident. The court noted that the decision as to
who is the more actively negligent is best made after the submission to the
court of all the facts including each party's act and the relation of the par-
ties to each other. Comparing the delinquency of both parties, the court
found the longshoreman who handled the drums to be actively negligent
and the Belgian Line who had failed to warn to be passively negligent.
149
When the Love Canal plaintiffs seek to impose liability on the United
States for injuries they have sustained from hazardous wastes, the United
States can be expected to seek to shift their liability to the disposers. The
United States should be successful in doing so if they can demonstrate that
their failure to warn is negligence of a passive nature and the disposers'
actions demonstrated negligence of an active nature.
When the United States seeks indemnity from a joint tortfeasor, it must
prove the same elements of duty, breach, causation and damages as would
a private plaintiff.'50 In arguing a disposer's duty to exercise care in dump-
ing waste, the United States will be aided by New York cases which dis-
cuss a landowner's duty of care.' 5' In Miner v. Long Island Lighting Co. ,"52
the court found that stringing high-voltage lines between closely-spaced,
private residences increased the risk of harm to residents to the highest
order and correspondingly imposed upon the power company controlling
the lines the duty to do so with due care. 53 The defendant could, there-
fore, be held liable when injury resulted from his failure to make an in-
spection of these lines that were under his control for thirty years. In Meyer
v. State,154 the state was held proportionately liable with a student who
had leaned on and fallen from a dilapidated bridge on a back path of a
state university campus. The court ruled that the foreseeability that stu-
dents would use the back paths of the campus imposed a duty on the
school to use reasonable care in maintaining the condition of the paths.
That standard contemplated the school's conducting an inspection of the
149. Id at 328-30, 107 N.E.2d at 471-72.
150. The focus of this Comment is on the United States' duty to the Love Canal plaintiffs
as well as Hooker's duty to dispose of its wastes in a safe manner. For considerations of the
elements of knowledge of the risk and causation, which will be important in a Love Canal
plaintiff's suit against the United States and a United States' suit against a disposer, see infra
note 186.
151. See, e.g., Miner v. Long Island Lighting Co., 40 N.Y.2d 372, 353 N.E.2d 805, 386
N.Y.S.2d 842 (1976); Meyer v. State, 92 Misc. 2d 996, 403 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1978).
152. 40 N.Y.2d 372, 353 N.E.2d 805, 386 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1976).
153. Id at 379, 353 N.E.2d at 809, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
154. 92 Misc. 2d 996, 403 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1978).
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area which would have disclosed the condition of the bridge.155 In its suit
for indemnification based on negligence theory, therefore, the United
States will not only rely upon the passive-active negligence line of cases
but will also stress that the disposer's actions constitute a breach of the
standard of care which New York has imposed on landowners.
2 Nuisance Theory
As an alternative theory for indemnification, the United States may elect
to proceed under a nuisance theory. The United States has previously
sought relief from polluters based on a public nuisance theory. 56 A public
nuisance claim is often brought by government officials to remedy an act
which interferes with the rights of the general public. 57 In hazardous
waste pollution cases, the United States has brought suits pursuant to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). 58 Section
7003 of the Act' 59 permits the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to bring a suit for injunctive relief and any other relief
against a handler of hazardous waste upon evidence that the handler's ac-
tivity presents an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or
to the environment. One of the relatively few courts160 which has inter-
preted section 7003, however, held that this section is a jurisdictional pro-
155. Id at 997, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
156. United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv. of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D.
Conn. 1980); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980);
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Il. 1973).
157. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 39, at § 88.
158. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6978 (1976).
159. Id § 6973. The section reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence that
the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or
hazardous waste is presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the
United States in the appropriate district court to immediately restrain any person
for contributing to the alleged disposal to stop such handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal or to take such other action as may be necessary. The
Administrator shall provide notice to the affected State of any such suit. The Ad-
ministrator may also, after note to the affected State, take other action under this
section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to
protect public health and the environment.
160. See ALI-ABA, supra note 8, at 143-75. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne, No.
C-1-79-703 (S.D. Ohio, filed Dec. 19, 1979) (1.5 million gallons of hazardous chemical
wastes were disposed of on a four acre site); United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., No.
IP-80-457C (S.D. Ind., filed May 9, 1980) (13-acre chemical treatment and storage facility,
containing 40-60 thousand 55-gallon drums of hazardous materials, is located within 3,000
feet of residential dwellings); United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., No. C-80-1857
(M.D. Ohio, filed Oct. 7, 1980) (three-quarters of a million tons of chromate wastes were
dumped on a 100-acre tract of land between 1931 and 1972).
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vision and any obligations, duties, disabilities or liabilities which may be
imposed are created by the federal common law of nuisance. 6' Of signifi-
cance to the United States under the procedure proposed in this Comment
is judicial support for the theory that the United States may request dam-
ages when asserting a claim under the federal common law of nuisance.'
62
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE TO ESTABLISHING LIABILITY FOR
HAZARDOUS WASTES
A Love Canal plaintiff may seek damages for his injuries from hazard-
ous wastes by asserting the United States' liability to him under the FTCA.
Under the framework of this Act, a plaintiff would argue that the United
States' undertaking in the waste disposal area pursuant to the Public
Health Service Act of 1944 (PHSA) 163 was a "gratuitous undertaking." As
such, it arguably established the United States' duty to them under section
323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. ' 64 A Love Canal plaintiff would
then demonstrate the following elements of a section 323 action: that the
United States owed them a direct service' 65 and that they either detrimen-
tally relied on this undertaking 66 or that the undertaking increased their
risk of harm.1
67
To establish that the United States' undertaking was intended to provide
a direct service, a Love Canal plaintiff should assert that this goal was
clearly expressed in the statute and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Under the PHSA, the United States undertook to "conduct research, ex-
periments, demonstrations and studies regarding the methods of sewage
disposal in sanitary landfills."' 6' Though couched in broad, philanthropic
terms, the purpose of these undertakings was to benefit United States citi-
161. United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv. of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1142
(D. Conn. 1980).
162. United States v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 501 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Mo. 1980). In this
case, the United States sought to recover costs of removing an obstruction and to recover
damages alleging that the obstruction was a nuisance. The court stated that equitable relief
was not the exclusive remedy under a public nuisance theory.
163. The Public Health Service Act of 1944, ch. 376, § 301, 58 Stat. 691 (1944) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1976)). While it has been alleged that the United States dumped
wastes from the Manhattan project near the Love Canal site from 1944-1946, and the United
States might theoretically be sued for those acts, this Comment focuses on a suit where Love
Canal plaintiffs would premise United States liability solely on its negligence in carrying out
its responsibilities under the PHSA. See [1981] 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1927.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
165. See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
168. The Public Health Service Act of 1944, ch. 376, § 301, 58 Stat. 691 (1944) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1976)); see also 42 C.F.R. § 02.205 (1944).
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zens by studying the "causes, diagnoses and treatment of certain impair-
ments of man, among these namely, sewage treatment."' 69
The Act also provided that the United States render assistance on these
problems to local authorities. 7 ° A court may be expected to examine this
particular undertaking, as the court did in Roberson v. United States17 1 to
determine whether the plaintiff or a third party was the intended benefici-
ary of this service. If a Love Canal plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he,
rather than the local authorities, was to be the intended beneficiary, then
his action will not survive past the direct service requirement. To deter a
court from finding that local health authorities were the intended benefi-
ciaries of the federal government's assistance, a Love Canal plaintiff
should stress that since he was the party who would suffer disease or im-
pairment from improper disposal practices, he was the intended benefici-
ary of the PHSA's undertaking.
When examining the direct service element of a Love Canal plaintiff's
suit, a court will engage in the same type of regulatory and statutory analy-
sis as the courts did in Clemente v. United States172 and Raymer v. United
States. 173 A Love Canal plaintiff should stress that the United States' un-
dertaking pursuant to the PHSA is similar to the United States' undertak-
ing in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (FCMHSA) reviewed
in Raymer. Both statutes evidence a mandate to provide protection for
United States' citizens. In contrast, the PHSA is much more oriented to-
ward a specific goal than the statute examined in Clemente which solely
granted the Administrator of the FAA the discretionary authority to pro-
mulgate air traffic safety regulations.
United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States 74 generally instructs that
a plaintiff who seeks to impose section 323 liability in federal court must
show that that action is recognized under state law. Such an action is rec-
ognized by New York courts. 7 In Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein and Weis-
ingner,176 for example, liability was imposed on an attorney who
undertook to file a security agreement for a client, but failed to do so. The
attorney was required to make restitution to the client for the amount of
the security interest.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
170. Id § 241.
171. 382 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967). See supra notes 18, 65-85 and accompanying text.
172. 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1978). See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
173. 482 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Ky. 1979). See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
174. 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
176. 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1977). See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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Once a Love Canal plaintiff has demonstrated that the PHSA was an
undertaking of a direct service to him, he must demonstrate that he detri-
mentally relied on this service or that the service increased his risk of
harm. Indian Towing Co. v. United States'7 7 recognized that where the
United States' conduct has engendered reliance and where a plaintiff has
been harmed thereby, the United States may be liable. Where the under-
taking doesn't involve an outward act, but rather a regulation or order, a
plaintiff must allege his reliance on the acts required by that order. 178 A
Love Canal plaintiff must therefore argue that he was harmed as a result of
relying on the United States' undertaking to supervise national disposal
practices and to study the impairments to them from this activity. 179 Of
particular benefit to a Love Canal plaintiff in establishing detrimental reli-
ance is the recognition in section 323 that
courts have tended to seize upon almost any trivial and technical
conduct of the defendant, to find that he has. . . 'entered upon'
his undertaking. Thus the defendant is held liable where he has
merely received a document. . . although such acts themselves
have played no part in inducing the plaintiff's reliance or in caus-
ing harm to him.180
In analogizing the activities of the United States to that of private indi-
viduals, a Love Canal plaintiff should argue the similarity between the
United States' undertaking and that of the defendants in Zibbon v. Town of
Cheektowaga.I8 1 In that case, New York imposed liability on defendants
who had assured plaintiffs protection and withdrew that protection with-
out warning the beneficiaries. With regard to waste disposal in the 1940's
and 1950's, the United States acted in a similar manner. Pursuant to the
PHSA, it undertook to be the wellspring of investigative efforts in the
waste disposal area. Despite this undertaking, the federal government did
not conduct research, experiments, demonstrations or studies regarding the
methods of sewage disposal in sanitary landfills. If such studies were un-
dertaken, the federal government breached the duty it assumed by failing
to warn of the dangers of existing disposal methods or by failing to advise
177. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Cal. 1981). A Love
Canal plaintiff must stress that his injury occurred from reliance on conduct so as not to
trigger the United States' defense that his claim sounds in misrepresentation. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (1976). See supra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
179. Tactically, Love Canal plaintiffs may be able to demonstrate their reliance on these
undertakings by introducing letters they had written to local or federal health authorities
which questioned the safety or propriety of dumping practices.
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323, Comment d (1965).
181. 51 A.D.2d 448, 382 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1976). See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying
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the Love Canal residents that it was not providing the services it had
undertaken.
As an alternative to demonstrating their detrimental reliance, a Love
Canal plaintiff may premise section 323 liability by demonstrating that the
United States' undertaking increased his risk of harm. United States v.
Gavagan182 and United States v. DeVane, 183 as well as the New York cases
of Zibbon v. Town of Cheektowagai" 4 and Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc. ,85 generally instruct that a plaintiff demonstrates his increased risk of
harm by arguing that he exercised few precautions because he relied on the
defendant's undertaking. To demonstrate this element, therefore, a Love
Canal plaintiff must argue that he failed to move from the area or take
other precautions to ensure his safety because he relied on the investiga-
tory and supervisory role which the United States undertook in this area
pursuant to the PHSA. 86
182. 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960). See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
183. 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962). See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
184. 51 A.D.2d 448, 382 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1976). See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying
text.
185. 50 N.Y.2d 507, 407 N.E.2d 451 (1981). See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying
text.
186. See supra notes 125-39 and accompanying text. To successfully allege a tort action,
a plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed him a duty, that the duty was breached, and
that the breach caused him injury and the extent of his damages. While this paper focuses on
establishing the United States' duty to a Love Canal plaintiff, a Love Canal plaintiff must
also offer proof on the other elements of a tort.
Of particular importance to this action would be demonstrating that the dangers of im-
proper dumping of chemicals wastes were capable of discovery. New York has long recog-
nized that the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed. Palsgrafv. Long
Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Since the United States can only be respon-
sible for facts which it could have discovered, demonstrating the United States' knowledge
of the dangers of current disposal practices is crucial to a finding of liability.
This will require that plaintiffs show that even in the 1940's, waste disposal authorities
realized the potential danger of the current methods of industrial waste disposal and knew of
precautions which could have been utilized. It will be easier to show this knowledge from
the mid- 1960's to 1976 because of increased legislation dealing with this specific problem.
See generally Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 249 (1979); 3 R. POJASEK, ToxIc AND HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL 1-11 (1977). In the
early 1960's, however, some authorities were aware of the potential danger in current dispo-
sal practices. For an article primarily concerning the hazards of chemicals from military and
space programs but which mentions the greater potential for harm when these substances
meet with industrial chemicals from civilian commerce, see Report to the Legislative Draft-
ing Research Fund, On Credible Catastrophic Eventualities in SelectedAreas of Government-
Sponsored Activities, Columbia Univ., Sept. 1963. At that time, engineers recognized the
migratory nature of certain wastes disposed in landfills and warned of the dangers in dis-
turbing the waste deposits by too rapid development or construction in the area. R. Ross,
INDUSTRIAL WASTE DISPOSAL (1968). Ross states:
There are several factors which should be considered carefully before burial or
open landfill is used as a means of disposal. The first consideration is that of ero-
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B. Meeting the United States' Defenses
After establishing a prima facie case, the Love Canal plaintiffs must
sion. Many types of mixed wastes are by nature porous. Therefore, unless this ma-
terial is to undergo many years of natural compaction due to exposure to the
elements and decay before the land is reclaimed for industrial or domestic building
purposes, it is necessary to consider more than just the mere dumping of the waste
into a land depression. If the area is to be reclaimed within a short period of time
(several years after the land is used for disposal), then some artificial compaction
method must be applied to increase the density of the area to prevent erosion of the
subsurface and to fill the voids between the various materials used for land fill.
This is strictly a problem of soil mechanics and requires a study of the water runoff
in the area to be sure that the land fill operation produces the desired result.
The second important consideration is that of contamination. While garbage and
many other types of domestic wastes have been used for land fill operations, the
problems of odor and rodent control can be serious. More important, however, is
possible contamination of the water shed or underground streams by the leaching
operation of rainwater passing through the waste and removing toxic or other con-
taminative materials from the waste and depositing them in wells or springs within
the area. Therefore, it should be a concern of the engineer involved in land fill
operations to dump only those things which cannot cause such future contamina-
tion near the disposal area.
Id at 260-61.
To establish that the dangers of disposal practices were recognized prior to the 1960's, a
Love Canal plaintiff may have to rely on local health reports and studies, such as the one
conducted in Niagara Falls. See Havens & Emerson, supra note 24, at xi. Plaintiffs can
expect the United States to assert the defense that waste disposal was accomplished in ac-
cordance with the then-current technology and state of the art. Plaintiffs who sued chemical
companies for damages caused by diethylstilbestrol (DES) also faced the problem of show-
ing their defendants' knowledge of the lack of safety of their undertaking. Several DES
plaintiffs successfully proved this in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div.
1981). See Note, Market Share Liability.- A New Method of Recoveryfor D.E S. Litigants, 30
CATH. U.L. REV. 551 (1981). Plaintiffs should argue that methods employed in any trade,
business or profession, however long they have been used, cannot be established as safe in
law when they are dangerous in fact. See Tug Ocean Prince v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151
(2d Cir. 1978); see also The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
Another crucial element for a Love Canal plaintiff to prove is that the improper disposal
of chemicals caused his injury. Proving that the chemicals deposited at Love Canal have
caused cancers, miscarriages and birth defects may be the most difficult task facing a plain-
tiff. See Tilevitz, Judicial 4ttitudes Toward Legal and Scientfic Proof of Cancer Causation, 3
COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 344 (1977); McGarity, Finessing Causation.: Three Novel Theories of
Recoveryfor Carcinogenic Risk, ALI-ABA, supra note 8, at 326. To prove causation, the
plaintiff must be able to isolate the harm-causing substance, trace its pathway of dispersal
from the polluter to the victim, and show the etiology of the harm-causing substance. Theo-
retically, absent extensive data, causation cannot be firmly established. Even with a full-
scale epidemiological study, defendants can usually produce their own experts who will tes-
tify that the disease or defect was caused by some other source. Proposasi, supra note 38, at
706. Despite these difficulties, courts have exhibited some degrees of willingness to recognize
that drugs and man-made substances, see, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), can
result in human disease. Alternatively, plaintiffs can point to the statutory definition of haz-
ardous wastes which is contained in the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA);
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meet the United States' defenses of the statute of limitations, 87 discretion-
ary function 88 and misrepresentation.' 89 The United States may be ex-
pected to raise the statute of limitations as its first defense. A plaintiff will
be able to overcome this defense if he demonstrates that he presented his
claim in writing to the appropriate agency within two years after the claim
accrues or within six months after the date the agency mails the notice of
its final denial of the claim. The issue that will prompt greater debate
under the statute of limitations defense, however, is whether a plaintiff's
claim accrues on the date he first comes into contact with a toxic substance
or on the date that he discovers he has been injured. New York courts have
held that a tort plaintiff's claim accrues on the former date while federal
courts, in ruling on FELA and FTCA suits, have favored the latter date. A
Love Canal plaintiff must argue that federal law governs when a claim
accrues for FTCA statute of limitations purposes,' 90 and that the Supreme
Court has addressed the issue of when a claim accrues in latent injury
cases.' 9 ' As the Supreme Court has stated in Urie v. Thompson, 192 the
claim of a plaintiff who suffers a delayed manifestation injury doesn't ac-
crue until he becomes aware of the injury. Expressing similar concern for a
plaintiff's rights in a medical malpractice case under the FTCA, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Kubrick 93 held that a plaintiffs claim
accrues when he learns of the injury and its suspected cause. At that point,
the plaintiff was charged with the task of determining whether his injury
was caused by negligence. Therefore, a Love Canal plaintiff must show
that he has presented an administrative claim either within two years after
learning of his injury and of the present contamination of his body by
chemicals disposed at the site or within six months after his claim has been
administratively denied. In arguing against application of New York's ac-
crual of injury theory, a Love Canal plaintiff should stress that the Court's
holding in Kubrick was based on the Urie rationale of fairness to a latent
injury plaintiff.
The United States will next assert the discretionary function defense
hazardous wastes are defined there to be those which cause certain diseases. See supra note 3
and accompanying text.
187. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). See supra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
190. Kossick v. United States, 330 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1964). See supra notes 105-08 and
accompanying text.
191. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111
(1979) See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
192. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
193. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
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which has been its most successful defense under the FTCA.' 94 Specifi-
cally, the United States would stress that its enactment of the PHSA was a
policy decision involving government discretion and that this should shield
the United States from liability. To counter this defense, a Love Canal
plaintiff should argue that despite the initial policy decision to enact the
PHSA and to assume its duties, the United States was negligent on an
operational level in failing to fulfill the duties imposed by the Act. As the
Supreme Court held in Indian Towing Co. ,95 an initial exercise of discre-
tion by the government would not excuse subsequent negligence in imple-
menting that government policy. Thus, a Love Canal plaintiff must show
that the United States was negligent in implementing the Act by disregard-
ing disposal research and by failing to provide him directly, or via local
health authorities, with information on the risks involved in current meth-
ods of disposal.
Finally, the United States can be expected to claim that a Love Canal
plaintiff's cause of action is based on a theory of misrepresentation. The
United States may acknowledge that its failure to warn residents was an
implicit representation that the area was safe. It would then argue pursu-
ant to the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Neustadt 96 that this
misrepresentation is the cause of a Love Canal plaintiff's injury. As Neu-
stadt made clear, if an injury results from reliance on a statement, the
misrepresentation defense applies. To overcome this argument, a Love Ca-
nal plaintiff must assert that he has been injured by the United States'
negligent conduct in allowing the dumping of hazardous wastes to con-
tinue. A Love Canal plaintiff would argue Neustadt's recognition that the
misrepresentation defense does not shield the United States from liability
where injury results from negligent conduct as it did in Indian Towing Co.,
where the United States failed to keep a lighthouse operating.
V. THE UNITED STATES' SUIT AGAINST THE DISPOSERS
A. Negligence Theory
The FTCA allows the United States to seek indemnification from a joint
tortfeasor if indemnity is recognized under state law.' 97 As the court in
McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige'9 s described the application of this
194. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
195. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
196. 336 U.S. 696 (1961).
197. Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967). See supra note 141
and accompanying text.
198. 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952). See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying
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theory in New York, a passively negligent party, who has failed to warn,
may seek indemnity from an actively negligent party as long as the passive
party demonstrates the corresponding nature of both party's acts. Under
this framework, the United States would argue that though it may have
passively sanctioned Hooker's waste disposal by failing to warn area resi-
dents of the dangers involved in the chemical company's activity, Hooker
was the actively negligent party because it disposed of wastes in an im-
proper manner.
Additionally, the United States would offer proof on each of the ele-
ments of the prima facie negligence case.' 9 9 In establishing Hooker's duty
to dispose of its wastes in a safe manner, the United States should argue
cases discussing a landowner's duty of care.2°' In Miner v. Long Island
Lighting,2 1 New York charged a landowner with the duty of making in-
vestigations of property under his control. Similarly, in Meyer v. State of
New York,2 °2 a landowner was required to keep objects on his property in
good repair. The United States should argue that Hooker fell far short of
these obligations when it continued to dump hazardous wastes at the Love
Canal site, despite its knowledge213 that the chemicals were not being con-
199. See supra notes 150, 186 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
201. 40 N.Y.2d 372, 353 N.E.2d 805, 386 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1976).
202. 92 Misc. 2d 996, 403 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1978).
203. See DISPOSAL HEARINGS, supra note 1, at 665. See Comment, Love Canal, supra
note 8, at 143. On the element of Hooker's foreseeability, this article states:
Chemical companies such as Hooker know, or at least should have reason to know
on the basis of the training that every chemist, chemical engineer, and chemical
technician receives, that no responsible chemical laboratory operation, whether
under industrial, academic, or other auspices, would tolerate in its small-scale
bench activities waste disposal practices analogous to the large scale plant-level
dumping practices conducted at Love Canal. Chemistry and chemical engineering
laboratories characteristically and routinely maintain safe disposal vessels for dif-
ferent classes and types of compounds. When landfill disposal must be resorted to
for lack of any reasonable alternative, they specify procedures calculated to avoid
or at least minimize the known or knowable risks of environmental contamination
or health hazard. They insist on rigid preventive and corrective standards and pro-
cedures relative to any possibility of present or future hazards arising from fire,
explosion, toxicity, spillage, radiation, electricity, and the like. (emphasis in the
original).
Id at 143 (citing H. STRAuSS, HANDBOOK FOR CHEMICAL TECHNICIANS § 10-6 (1976)).
On the issue of Hooker's disclaimer of liability which it included in its deed to the School
Board, see N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15108 (McKinney 1978) (where one tort-feasor exe-
cutes a disclaimer, an injured party is not thereby prevented from suing another tort-feasor).
Furthermore, at common law, New York has not allowed such disclaimers to exempt the
executing party from liability where to do so would be against public policy. Bradley Realty
Corp. v. State of New York, 54 A.D.2d 1104, 389 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1976).
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tained and that they were leaching and causing physical injuries to neigh-
boring residents.
B. Nuisance Theory
The RCRA allows the United States to seek injunctive and other neces-
sary relief against a disposer whose activity presents an imminent and sub-
stantial danger to health and the environment. 2" Since RCRA is arguably
only a jurisdictional statute,20 5 the United States must allege a theory of
liability against a disposer. In RCRA suits filed against hazardous waste
disposers, the United States has asserted the federal common law theory of
public nuisance. Utilizing this theory in the Love Canal context, the
United States has specifically alleged that Hooker's activity presents an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the health and welfare of the
United States citizens.2" 6 In addition to an injunction, the United States
has prayed that the court order Hooker's compliance with a remedial plan
requiring Hooker to construct grout curtain walls to prevent further leach-
ing, pay for a health monitoring system and reimburse the United States
for its remedial costs in the area.20 7
V. CONCLUSION
Under the procedure suggested in this Comment, Love Canal plaintiffs,
the federal government, and the Hooker Chemical Company will be at-
tempting to apply traditional theories of liability to redress or defend inju-
ries from a relatively newly discovered source. The FTCA has proven to
be a satisfactory vehicle for recovery for plaintiffs who can weave their
path through the twists and turns of its discretionary function and misrep-
resentation defenses. One advantage of the Act for a Love Canal plaintiff
is the Act's reliance on federal law to determine the accrual date of an
injury, because federal law has been more sympathetic than New York law
to plaintiffs who have suffered latent injuries. The FTCA also provides the
United States with the ability to argue its right to indemnity from Hooker.
The United States' alternatives of suing for indemnity under the FTCA, or
for equitable and compensatory relief under RCRA, should help to miti-
gate judicial concern about the chilling effect on future United States' un-
204. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1976). See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
206. See Complaint, United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics, No.79-990
(W.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 20, 1979), at 31.
207. Id at 40-45.
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dertakings which might result from imposing extensive liability on the
United States.
Valerie J Stanley
